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Edward S. Shaw*
Inflation on an international scale was neg-
ligible or modest into the early 1960's. Then it
accelerated, slowly through 1965, progressively
faster to the explosive climax of 1973-74. The
eclipse of price-level stability has been explained
in a variety of ways. One explanation blames
traumatic phenomena of commodity supply, in-
cluding crop failures and aggressive policies of
the petroleum oligopoly. Another points to so-
cial conflict. Factors such as these did generate
blips or bubbles in price levels, but they do not
account for the prolonged surge of inflation.
The inflation was a monetary phenomenon.
Money was supplied in excessive quantities
everywhere, and its value or purchasing power
decayed. Prime responsibility for excess money
lies with the fiscal-monetary policies of the
United States. Fiscal deficits of the American
government generated an increasing stock of
Treasury debt. Market prices bid for the debt
by the Federal Reserve and other national mone-
tary authorities drew virtually all of the debt
into the authorities' portfolios, and "high pow-
ered" or "reserve" money increased correspond-
ingly. The linkage of monetary systems by the
arrangements of Bretton Wood guaranteed the
subservience of "small" monetary systems to
policies of the American Treasury and central
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bank. Every monetary system expanded its na-
tional money supply on the basis of accumulat-
ing reserves. Then holders of money responded
as they always do to excess money supplies, by
speeding up their turnover rate or velocity of
money expenditure. The pace of growth in these
expenditures was progressively faster than the
pace of growth in real outputs of goods and
services. Accelerating inflation and the collapse
of Bretton Woods were the only possible out-
comes.
The first section below develops a model that
formalizes the fiscal-monetary explanation of
world inflation in a context of fixed foreign-ex-
change rates. There is a center country that
imposes inflationary shocks, and there are small
countries that contribute their shares to the up-
ward sweep of price levels. The model is
adapted to the regime of Bretton Woods. The
second section explores briefly the experience
of the United States as center and of eight other
countries as satellites during 1958-65. In those
years, by good luck or sound judgment, growth
of nominal money hewed quite closely to growth
in real money demanded by private sectors, and
the result was stability in markets for goods,
securities, and foreign exchange. The third sec-
tion has to do with the years 1966-73 that ter-
minated in the collapse of Bretton Woods. The
fourth section explores briefly potentials for in-
flation in the center country after foreign-ex-




The equilibrium growth path of the world's
price level depends on the relative growth paths
of nominal money supplied and real money de-
manded.
p W =:; rate of change in the world
price level in terms of the
center numeraire
m; = rate of change in the world
nominal money supply in
terms ofthe center numeraire
fu~ = rate of change in real money
demanded in the world econ-
omy.
A relative rise in the growth rate of nominal
money increases the rate of inflation though, in
the short run, some of the adjustment occurs in
growth rates of output and of real money de-
manded.
Equation (2) elaborates upon (1), distin-
guishing the growth paths of the center or large
country (u) and the satellite or small countries
(0). Equilibrium is assumed for every member
of the bloc; foreign-exchange rates are normal-
ized at unity; and all goods are classified as
tradeables.
(2) pW = [su(m~) + so(m~)]
- [su (m~ ) + So (m~ )]
Su and So = country weights, summingto unity.
1
Equation (3) elaborates upon (2), presenting
the determinants of growth in nominal money.*
(3) su(m~) +so(m~)= su(tu+ d(r
u
) )
° ° 1+r" + so(t +~ )
I +ro
"'The term d ( ) in the following equations is the differen-
tial ofthe function ( ).
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growth rate of international
monetary reserves held by the
monetary authority ofthe center
country.
to = growth rate of international
monetary reserves held by the
monetary authorities ofthe satel-
lites.
r
U = actual and desired ratio of
domestic non-reserve assets to
reserves in the monetary system
of the center country.
actual and desired ratio of
domestic non-reserve assets to
reserves in the monetary systems
of the satellite countries.
It is assumed that monetary systems, in acquir-
ing reserve and non-reserve assets, issue only
money-or that issues of money are in constant
proportion to issues of, say, time and savings
deposits and certificates of deposit. Interna-
tional reserves may include physical stocks of
gold, priced in the center's numeraire, and
SDR's as well. However, the analysis below
takes it for granted, in general, that these reserve
components do not grow. The component that
will concern us most is (T), interest-bearing
debt of the center's government at nominal
value. This is a policy variable, its growth rate (t)
depending on growth in the center government's
real deficit and the rate ofinflation.
(4) t=e+pw
e = growth rate of the real debt ofthe
center government.
The ratios (r) of domestic credit to reserves
are also a policy variable. The assumption will
be that (ru ) is constant but that (ro) may be
changed by monetary authorities in small coun-
tries. Their decisions may be explained in this
fashion:+
o 0 0 0 w
(5) r = r (y , v , p )
yO = growth rate ofpermanent income in
the satellite countries.
V
U = growth rate ofreal imports into the
satellite countries.
Equation (5) suggests that portfolio preference
on the part of smali monetary systems shifts
away from reserve assets to domestic credit ac-
cordingly as the negative yield (pw) on the for-
mer increases and as positive yields on the latter
are generatedby speedier growth of output (yO).
It.suggests also that demand for reserve assets,
relative to domestic credit, tends to increase with
growth of international trade (v).
Equations (6) and (7) complete specifica-
tions for the supply component of equation (2).




U = t - s (to)
° s: ---s:-
These equations allocate growth in monetary
reserves between satellite and center monetary
systems. Equation (6) indicates that satellite
monetary authorities may accommodate as little
or as much as they wish of the center govern-
ment's deficit finance. They may resist importa-
tion of reserves, displacing reserves with domes-
tic credit and raising (rO) in the manner, say,
of Japan. They may welcome reserve inflows
and economize on domestic credit, atlow values
of (ro), in the style of The Netherlands. Equa-
tion (7) indicates that the monetary authority
of the center country is the residual buyer of its
government's debt issues. Itestablishes and de-
fends a rate of interest for government securities
that is low enough, relative to other rates of
interest, to repel demand for (T) by the non-
monetary sector of the world economic system.
Equation (8) elaborates upon the demand
element of equation (2).
(8) Su (iii~)+ So (iii~)= su (T)~yU- T)~wpW)
T) y y = responseofgrowth in real money
demanded to growth in perma-
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nent income.
T) p W P W = responseofgrowthin real money
demanded to inflation.
The (T) y) in this equation is the income elasticity
of demand for money, and (7]pw) is the inflation
elasticity. We suppose that real rates of inter-
est are constant and that expected inflation is
equal to actual inflation. Nominal rates of in-
terest, suppressed in this model, vary with (pW).
If one were to trace a temporal path defined
partly by (8), he would observe a redistribution
of the world's real money balances, a larger
share accruing in countries with high growth
rates of real income, and with low sensitivity, on
the part of the money-holders, to inflation.
We have now a very small model to guide
analysis of inflation in 1958-73· There are three
equations. One is equation (2), expanded by
(3), (4), (5) and (8). The others are (6) and
(7). The three endogenous variables, deter-
mined by the model, are (pW), (to), and (tu).
Instruments of policy are the fiscal-monetary in-
strument of the center country (t) and the port-
folio-choice instrument of the satellites (rO).
Other instruments will be introducedinformally,
including the foreign-exchange rate between
center and satellites and the issuance of SDR's.
Compressionof the model to only three equa-
tions has its analytical costs. For example, one
does not observe explicitly that the nominal
money stock and its growth rate in the center
country are not determined exclusively by the
monetary authority of the center. Given (t)
and the international pattern of demand for real
money, (m:) is determined partly by the port-
folio choices of foreign monetary authorities.
High values of (ro) imply relatively large stocks
of money in the center, low values of (ro) rela-
tively small stocks in the center. The world's
nominal money supply and the supply in each
country are at the mercy of decisions by all
monetary authorities.
In an harmonious monetary world, with con-
stant foreign-exchange rates, monetary authori-
ties would wield their control instruments in a
mutually satisfactory way. The center would
manage (t) and (ru); the satellites would man-age (ro); and everyone would be satisfied with
paths taken by nominal money and the price
level. The rate of inflation everywhere is at the
mercy of monetary expansion anywhere, but a
consensus about the optimal inflation rate can
hold the monetary community together. 2
There is some risk of excessive instability in
the integrated monetary world when the mone-
tary authority of the center watches over (ru )
only and neglects changes in the constellation
of reserve and domestic-credit ratios in small
countries. Ifits conception of its role is myopic,
fixed only upon domestic monetary develop-
ments, the possibility is not negligible that con-
certed changes abroad in desired portfolio ratios
ofsmall monetary systems will induce important
changes in world growth rates of money and
prices. When foreign-exchange rates are fixed,
the center ignores monetary policies in small
countries at some peril to world stability.3
The source of instability that concerns us
most originates with the center, mainly through
an increase in (t) butpotentially as well through
an increase of (r
u
). One recalls that (t) is the
growth rate for primary debt (T) of the center's
fiscal authority, the variable reserve asset of the
world's monetary system." The initial distur-
bance on the markets for reserves and money
caused by an increase in (t) may be absorbed
smoothly by the world's monetary system. Per-
haps as the result of coincidental increases in
world trade flows (v), there may be reductions
in desired domestic-credit ratios of small coun-
tries that limit the multiplicative impact on
money supplies. Again, concurrent growth of
permanent incomes (y) may draw increments
of nominal money into real money balances at
an essentially stable rate of price inflation. That
is to say, declines in (r') and increases in (m~)
may neutralize acceleration of (t).
Sustained and accelerated growth in (T),
combined with unfortunate but not improbable
monetary policies in the center and its satellites,
however, has ominous potentialities for the
world monetary system.
5 Growth in the nominal
value of international reserves has been de-
scribed in equation (4), repeated here:
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(9) t=e+pw
With (pW) initially at zero, the center govern-
ment may be driven by political considerations,
perhaps by a war, into acceleration in growth of
its real debt (e) and correspondingly in (t). The
center monetary authority, trying to inhibit an
upward sweep of domestic rates of interest, can
be expected to increase open-market purchases
and (to). Inevitably international balances of
payment would transmit some of the growth in
(t) to small monetary systems. The effect can
be to reduce their domestic-credit ratios below
desired levels and so to accelerate their mone-
tization of domestic credit. Some increase in the
rate of inflation must occur, and then (t) must
increase again. Nominal rates of interest, re-
sponding to growth in (pW), must rise and in-
duce faster monetization of deficits in the center,
given the illusion of the center monetary author-
ity that there is no difference between real and
nominal rates of interest. The likelihood of dra-
matic growth in the world's money supply and
price level is not small for any large increase in
(e). Needless to say, an initial reduction of (e)
could precipitate cumulative deflation. The real
fiscal objectives of the center and its monetary
policies, together with portfolio preferences of
small monetary systems, have a common and
interacting bias toward monetary instability.
This scenario of fiscal and monetary insta-
bility is still incomplete. Growth of (e), (t),
(m~), and (pW) must be expected, on the basis
of equation (8), to induce some decline in the
world growth rate of real money demanded and
some increase in the growth rate of money's
velocity. Moneyholders respond to the inflation
tax by the obvious strategem of demanding
slower growth in real money balances. Any de-
cline in (fii~) must push inflation along still
faster, according to equation (1), and contribute
to the quickening growth of nominal fiscal defi-
cits, nominal reserves, and nominal money sup-
plies. Money-holders, too, have a role in the
explosive sequence.
The stage now is set for the collapse of inter-
national monetary arrangements. Monetary sys-
tems of small countries cannot give vent to theirportfolio preference for domestic over interna-
tional assets by accelerating domestic credit ex-
pansion, because the inflationary outcome would
be intolerable. Specific interventions on capital
markets, goods markets, and the foreign ex-
changes are too costly in investment and trade
distortions. The only acceptable way of preserv-
ing relative price-level stability and desired port-
folio balance is simultaneously to depreciate the
center currency at some rate and
to raise (ro). We may introduce the new instru-






= m,- m d
0 0 • (12) m t -f+ ,
1+r .
f = rate ofchange in price ofthe center
money in terms ofthe numeraire of
the small economy.
The moves for of the small econ-
omy reduce accumulation of reserves there and
increase (t"), the rate of growth of high-powered
money in the center. The consequence for the
center, given budgetary policy, is necessarily still
more rapid inflation. Presumably the time must
come when, out of despair over its own inflation-
ary the center reduces the
rate of its real budget deficit. Fixed foreign-
exchange rates provide an opportunity for the
center country to induce world-wide inflation.
Floating exchange rates permit small countries
to choose their own paths and may
induce the erstwhile center country not to heap
inflationary abuse upon its own monetary sys-
tem.
It may be to reiterate the real aspects
of inflation and monetary crisis. The crisis we
have synthesized is initiated by a fiscal decision
in the center country for a real budget deficit,
financed by seignorage and inflation-tax rev-
enues. Excess real money balances induce sub-
stitutions by private sectors against money in
favor of wealth in other forms and perhaps of
consumption. Unbalanced portfolios induce sub-
stitutions by small monetary systems against in-
ternational reserves in favor of claims on domes-
tic wealth, and they may induce changes in the
relative price of the center currency. The crisis
is a real phenomenon. However, it could not
happen except for one capitulation to money-
illusion, the "low" interest-rate policy of the
center's monetary authority. That policy pre-
vents the diversion of away from mcmetm'Y
systems and the monetary base.
Ii. Bretton Woods in Bloom: 1958-65
In this section, we undertake an informal
analysis of international monetary experience,
applying the model of the preceding section. The
analysis relates to just the United States and
eight "small" countries. It covers the period
when monetary experience was serene, 1958-65,
and when only a few factors were in that
might disturb that serenity. Table I provides a
few insights into the real and monetary contours
of the period.
Growth in real incomes and in trading during
these years induced growth in real money de-
manded: the velocity data suggest that the
growth rate of real money balances exceeded the
growth rate of real income in most cases. This
meant, of course, that the international mone-
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tary system was realizing efficiency gains from
money-deepening. Stability of nominal rates of
interestsuggests that demand for real money was
notdamped by acceleratinginflationary expecta-
tions. Such expectations were missing, of course,
because monetary authorities, including the
United States as center and others as sat,ellites,
constrained growth of nominal money to modest
levels. Demand - pull by money - holders for
monetary expansion was accommodated
by monetary authorities at essentially stable
price levels.
Patterns of in
among monetary systems, between international
reserves and domestic credit, are suggested in
Table II.Table I
Growth Experience in Nine Countries: 1958-19651
United



















Growth Rates of Nominal Money
1.7 3.5 5.8 10.8 11.1 12.2
3.3 7.6 9.0 13.1 8.9 13.6
Growth Rates of Real GNP
2.4 2.9 3.0 5.2 7.7 6.5
5.6 5.2 6.3 6.0 5.0 4.5
Growth Rates of GNP Deflator
1.8 1.0 1.3 6.1 2.9 1.7
1.5 3.4 2.2 4.3 3.9 6.1
Change in Money's Velocity
+ + +
+ + 0
Growth Rates of Imports
2.3 5.2 0.1 2.0 9.8 9.2















Government Bond Rates of Interest (end of year)
6.0 4.2 5.9 7.5 6.8 8.4 4.6
5.9 5.1 5.1 6.0 5.2 7.3 3.9




Monetary systems of the small countries sup-
plied growth domestically in nominal money by
acquiring both foreign assets, primarilygold and
U.S. dollars, and domestic assets. Evidently
there were substantial differences among coun-
tries in their relative tastes for reserves, on the
one hand, and claims against domestic wealth,
on the other. At the extreme, Japan may have
economized on reserves because its growth rate
of output and, correspondingly, rates of return
on domestic wealthwere high, while The Nether-
lands, facing lower opportunity costs of holding
reserves and having a higher proportion of im-
ports to national output, preferred a lower (ro).
Between 1958-61 and 1962-65, there was a
small shift, on the average, away from reserves.
However, since the only significant adjustment
in a foreign-exchange price of U.S. dollars dur-
ing the second interval was positive (Canada),
appreciating the U.S. dollar, one does not sense
a growing aversion to reserves.












'Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Rates of Change in Economic Data for Ten Industrial Countries; International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Table 111
Ratios of Foreign Assets to Domestic
Credit in the Monetary Systems of












Source: International Financial Statistics. The percentages
are four-year averages of end-of-year data.
10international monetary system, is indicated in goods abroad were financed by growing supplies
Table III. of securities to the center.
Growth in permanent income, imports, and Deficits and debt-issues of the American fed-
real money balances induced demand by small eral government supplied to the Federal Re-
countries for international reserves, and the serve, through its open-market operations, the
United States responded by export of $15.6 bil- assets that it demanded in replacement of gold
lion, 60 percent of it in gold and the remainder lost to abroad ($9.4 billion) and the assets that
in liquid external liabilities. Catering to demand it demanded for creation of domestic currency
abroad for reserves, the United States permitted and reserves of commercial banks in this coun-
its own reserve base of gold to erode. The ve- try ($9.5 billion). They supplied, too, growth
hide for international reserve transfers was, of of $6.2 billion in reserves of small monetary
course, the international balance of payments. systems. Some $25 billion of debt were floated
Net demands by small monetary systems upon by the Treasury of the United States to domestic
the United States for reserves were associated, and foreign monetary authorities, $15 billion
during 1958-65, with net demands upon the to other lenders: interest-rate policies of the
United States for goods and services. Economic Federal Reserve did not preempt, for the port-
growth abroad and military objectives as well folios of monetary authorities, the entire issue of
required not only an input of high-powered Treasury debt. One notes that there was no up-
money but an input too of goods and services ward drift of fiscal deficits during 1958-65. De-
for consumption and investment. Inevitably mands for money, gold, and debt of the United
these net demands for reserves, goods, and serv- States government were stimulated by growth of
ices were associated with net supplies, through the world's economy, and the demands were
"bond" markets, of securities to the United satisfied at relatively stable prices for goods, se-
States. Demand for these securities in the center curities, and foreign exchange.
country is explained by the relative attractive- The smooth accommodation of world mone-
ness of investment opportunities abroad that one tary expansion to economic growth yielded a
can sense in the relatively high growth rates of variety of gains in economic efficiency. For one,
output and income there and in the relatively stable expectations regarding price levels and
high rates of interest on government bonds. foreign-exchange rates encouraged the use of
Growing demands for real money, reserves, and dollars as a vehicle for settlements in world
Table liP




Change in international reserves
Change in external liquid liabilities to monetary
authorities and,governments
Total export of reserves
Fiscal
Deficits of the federal government
Increase in debt ofthe federal government
Monetary










Growth Experience in Nine Countries: 1966-1973
United Nether- Switzer-
States Belgium Canada France GermanY Italy Japan lands land
Growth Rates of Nominal Money
1966-69 5.4 5.5 9.7 6.4 6.4 14.2 15.7 8.2 7.4
1970-73 6.3 10:2 14.3 9.0 9.5 21.3 23.0 12.8 10.2
Growth Rates of Real GNP
1966-69 4.1 4.3 5.4 5.7 4.4 6.2 12.5 4.2 3.6
1970-73 3.7 5.2 5.2 5.8 4.1 3.8 9.1 5.8 4.7
Growth Rates of GNP Deflator
1966-69 3.7 3.7 4.0 4.3 2.6 2.7 4.2 4.8 4.0
1970-73 4.7 6.0 5.1 5.9 6.8 7.4 7.1 8.0 7.8
Change in Money'S Velocity
1966-69 + + + + + + +
1970-73 + + + + 0 +
Growth Rate of Imports
1966-69 13.6 11.4 12.7 13.9 9.3 14.0 16.4 10.3 9.4
1970-73 18.2 21.7 15.5 21.2 21.6 22.2 26.4 22.4 21.7
Government Bond Rates of Interest
(end of year)
1965 4.2 6.4 5.2 5.3 6.7 6.9 5.5 5.2 4.0
1969 6.1 7.2 7.6 7.6 6.8 6.9 6.3 7.5 4.9
1973 6.3 7.4 7.6 8.3 9.3 7.4 9.0 7.8 5.6
'Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Rates ofChange in Economic Data for Ten Industrial Countries; International
Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
trade: economies of a common currency were
realized. Again, growth in international capital
flows at stable price levels and exchange rates
inducedsubstantial reformin the capital markets
of small countries, presumably with greater
efficiency of allocation for savings in the mone-
tary area. Third, a market developed among
savers in small countries for non-monetary
claims against American financial institutions.
This country performed as a financial inter-
mediary, buying foreign investments at risk and
absorbing foreign savings in its own issues of
assets that appeared to be safer, at stableforeign-
exchange rates. Fourth, stable monetary growth,
investment opportunities in small countries, and
imperfections of capital markets there opened
the Eurodollar route to better savings alloca-
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tions. Some dollar payments to abroad did not
accumulate in reserve bases of monetary sys-
tems. Instead, private holders deposited them
with commercial banks, where they provided the
reserve base for Eurodollar loans and a super-
structure of term deposit accounts.
There were a few clouds in the generally clear
skies of 1958-65. Each represented a problem
of portfolio distortion. There was potentiality
of excess demand for gold in monetary port-
folios, but steps were taken to satisfy this de-
mand by isssuance of SDR's. There was con-
cern in some small countries that the flow of
their securities to the United States, in payment
for goods as well as for monetaryreserves, would
compromise too much national ownership ofnational wealth. It worried the United States
that capital outflow would impede domestic cap-
ital accumulation and impose unacceptable
losses of gold. It is not clear that American
authorities understood the role of fiscal deficits
and of capital outflows in satisfying external de-
mands for money and for monetary reserves.
m. Bretton Woods Plowed Under: 1966-73
'International Financial Statistics. The percentages are
averages of end-of-year data.
Table V1
Ratios of Foreign Assets to Domestic
Credit in the Monetary Systems
of Nine Countries: 1958-1913
(percent)
1966- 1910- 1966- 1958-
1969 1913 1913 1965
3.7 2.3 3.0 7.4
21.3 19.8 20.5 33.6
18.2 17.6 17.9 18.6
11.1 5.9 8.5 13.2
13.8 13.9 13.8 18.7
10.5 5.7 7.1 13.5
1.8 4.4 3.1 2.8
30.6 26.7 28.7 74.8
20.4 20.8 20.6 24.4
and actual domestic-creditratios increased. The
latter cannot be explained by the paths of per-
manent income and imports. The explanation
must be expectations of decay in the dollar's
foreign-exchange value and resistance against
the flow of seignorage andinflation-tax revenues
to the United States.
Distaste for internationalreserves, onthe part
















In this second interval, the United States
sharply increased (e), the growth rate of its real
fiscal debt, and (t), its supply of government
debtto monetaryreserves. Moreover, itadopted
a number of inefficient interventions in flows of
international trade andpayments. Theonly pos-
sible outcome was collapse of the international
monetary system.
Table IV, an extension of Table I, reports a
few aspects of 1966-73.
There is no mistaking the acceleration of
growth, from 1958-65 to 1966-73, in nominal
money for all countries, save Germany, repre-
sented in Table IV. At the same time, growth
rates of real GNP were giving little or no lift
to growth in real money demanded, and paths of
interest rates indicate that inflationary expecta-
tions were damping demand for real money. On
balance, money's velocity rose. The only pos-
sible outcome, of course, was higher rates of
growth in GNP deflators. During 1966-73, de-
mand-pull upon growth of nominal money at
stable prices was diminishing. Supply-push took
over, with faster inflation the result.
Faster growth in nominal money emanated
from both satellite countries and the center. For
the former, as Table V suggests, there was a
notable shift of portfolio preference away from
reserves to domestic credit: desired and actual
(rO) increased. It is useful to compare Tables
V and n.
Data for money's velocity tell us that private
sectors in small countries were economizing on
real money balances, shifting to other forms of
wealth. The data of Table V tell us that mone-
tary systems in small countries were trying to
economize on international reserves-and suc-
ceeding. Both low-powered and high-powered
money were in disfavor: the growth rate of
(ffi~) declined and the growth rates of desired
13ratios of foreign assets to domestic credit. Itis
attestedalso byextensive adjustments in foreign-
exchange rates for the dollar during 1966-73.
Each of the eight countries in Table V reduced
the price of the dollar in terms of the domestic
numeraire. Germany was the first, in 1969·
Canada and The Netherland followed in 1970.
Theothers revaluedrepetitivelyin 1971-73. The
portfolio shift against dollars became a flight.
Itwill be recalled that, during 1958-65, changes
in the prices of dollars were few and all but one
were positive. In the earlier years, (ro) and (f)
were stable, while in the later years (ro) rose
and (f) fell.
Table VI, an extension of Table III, bears on
the role of the United States in the inflation of
1966-73. It explains in broad terms the growth
of (t) that small countries attempted to resist.
Deficits anddebt of the American federal gov-
ernment increased by roughly the same order of
magnitude during 1966-69 as during the eight
years 1958-65, but these increases were modest
in comparison with those of 1970-73 when
growth of both (e) and (pw) accelerated. All
of the growth in federal debt found its way into
portfolios of monetary authorities during 1966-
73, with the Federal Reserve absorbing $43
billion and foreign authorities $51 billion.
Private sectors wantednoneofitat the monetary
authorities' support prices. Aside from its ex-
ports of federal debt, the United States shipped
to its satellites close to $3 billions in gold and
SDR's. Additional increments to high-powered
money abroad as well as in this countryincluded
growth in balances of SDR's, from initial allo-
cations, and capital gains on gold stocks as offi-
cial prices of gold increased. "Avalanche" is
rather too mild as a description of growth that
occurred in reserves of the world's monetary
system.
One criterion of efficient monetary policy in a
center country is moderation in the average
growth of reserves that it supplies. The Uniteg
States satisfied this criterion in 1958-65 and
violated it in 1966-73. A second criterion is
stability in the growth rate of reserves. The
United States satisfied this criterion in 1958-65
and violated it in 1966-73. During the two in-
tervals of eight years each, average annual in-
creases of America's external liquid liabilities to
monetary authorities and governments were,
successively, $8 billion and $16 billion. The
average annual deviations from mean growth of
external liquid liabilities were, successively, 40
percent and 68 percent. Stop-go policies in the










Change in international reserves
Change inexternalliquid liabilities to
monetary authorities andgovernments
Total export of reserves
Fiscal
Deficits of the federal government
Increase in debt of the federal
government
Monetary
























Source: International Financial Statistics.
14m U == rate ofgrowth in nominal money.
s
_ u
m d rate ofgrowth in real money de-
manded.
- ui m d = rate of growth in excess real
money balances.
p u rate of inflation without price
controls.
pUC == rate of inflation with price con-
trols.
pur = repressed inflation.
Fiscal and monetary policy, without price
ceilings, would have produced a rate of inflation
(pU). Interventions reduced the rate of inflation
temporarily to (pUC), and repressed inflation was
(pur). At ceiling prices, real money balances
demanded increased at the rate of (m~). Be-
cause real money balances supplied increased
even faster, involuntary holdings increased at the
rate (m~). Repressed inflation and excess real
money are twin aspects of the same distortion.
Of course, growth in real money demanded was
reduced by price controls accordingly as they
inhibited growth in real income.
Inevitably, given the pace of growth in nom-
inal money, the interventions in goods and labor
markets failed. When they were withdrawn, step
by step, money-holders set about to eliminate
undesired real balances by spending them. Then,
of course, inflation repressed became inflation
realized. This burst of growth in the price level
must have done its bit to diminish growth in real
money demanded, so thatinflation realized over-
compensated for repression. The mean rate of
inflation has been higher since 1970 than it
would have been in the absence of price and
wage controls.
Federal Reserve administration of Regulation
Q was another destabilizing intervention. When
rapid growth in motletary reserves and domestic-
credit ratios generated inflation, expectations of
inflation, and rising open-market rates of inter-
est, ceilings upon deposit rates in the United
States generated substantial flows of short-term
capital, private and governmental, to small
monetary systems and the Eurodollar markets.
The accumulations of dollar claims abroad were
sensitive not only to interest-rate differentials
but also to anticipations regarding change in
foreign-exchange prices of dollars. They shifted
between countries and, within anyone country,
between central bank and commercial banks.
Administration of Regulation Q aggravated in-
stability in the Bretton Woods regime.
Other interventions were applied on markets
for goods, capital and foreign exchange by both
the center and its satellites. There were "volun-
tary" credit restraints on capital exports, interest
equalization taxes, discriminatory taxes and de-
posit-rate regulations on capital imports, two-
tier foreign-exchange markets for current and










an erratic pattern of growth in international re-
serves, money supplies, and actual relative to
desired levels of (rO). It may be a fair presump-
tion thatthe collapse of BrettonWoods reflected,
in part, an attempt by small countries to escape
not just the escalation of monetary reserves but
instability in growth of reserves and in the im-
pact of monetary pressures on growth in price
levels and output as well.
It is a third criterion of efficient monetary
policy that the monetary authorities abstain
from specific interventions in various markets as
ways of preventing or undoing damage done by
policies affecting money. This criterion was vio-
lated with increasing frequency by both the
United States and the small countries during
1966-73, and awkward results of the specific
interventions appear to have been one more rea-
son for the demise of the Bretton Woods. The
intervention that comes first to mind is the im-
position of price controls, through successive
"phases," over goods and labor in the United
States from 1971. Its monetary effects are patent
in equations (13) and (14), written for this
country only:
15The growth rate of (t) depends on the real
expenditure objectives of government in the
United States and on the rate selected for the
inflation tax (pU). If (t) is no less in the new
regime than in the old, the level of Cpu) can be
notably higher. No longer is there growth de-
mand abroad for some part of (to) of (t). No
longer is growth abroadin real money demanded
a "leakage" for (t). The full force of fiscal-
monetary indiscretion hits the American mone-
tary system, its price level, and the price of dol-
lars on the foreign exchanges.
to with the general malaise of monetary foreign-exchange price for the dollar, would in-
Authorities of small monetary hibit toward infla-
terns speculated overtly on the foreign ex- tion. These authorities may have chosen the
changes. The result, of course, was to sacrifice lesser of two evils, imported inflation rather than
gains in efficiency that had emerged from mone- indigenous inflation. Another answer might be
tary unification under Bretton Woods. As these export sectors in small countries were op-
gains were sacrificed, the social benefit ofstaying posed to revaluations of domestic currencies
with stable exchange rates and tolerating un- against the dollar. If some small countries did
stable inflationary pressures evaporated. have selfish interests in staying with .l:3retton
As one reviews the sorry tale of Bretton Woods, why should the burdenofguilt for world
Woods, he may wonder why the small countries inflation be put upon the United States? The
with the as as they did. One appropriate rejoinder seems to be, "Why is
answer might be a stubborn faith of monetary credit due to the United States for exploiting the
authorities in some small countries that the bal- gullibility and vulnerability of its trading part-
ance-of-payments constraint, imposed by a fixed ners?"
IV. A Sequel to Bretton Woods
A dour pessimist might generate a bleak fore- Growth of the foreign-exchange rate is the link
cast of inflation for the United States, using an between "local" inflation rates:
adaptation of the model in Section I. With no •
change in its fiscal-monetary policies, the United (16) f = pU _ pO
States could release within its own boundaries
the inflationary pressures that were absorbed,
under Bretton Woods, by growth in demand for
dollar reserves worldwide. The result would be
inflation here at rates faster than the rates of
1970-73.
In the new world of floating foreign-exchange
rates the singular inflation paths, we may sup-
pose, (to) falls to zero and each small country
selects some domestic asset, with growth rate
(x), as the monetary base. Then price levels for
the United States and any small country, (pu)
and (pO), behave as follows:







(x + d(ro) ) - rn°
l+r° d
16FOOTNOTES
1. Country weights may change over time if real growth
rates differ between countries. If the satellite is Japan and
the United States is the center, (so) rises and (su) de-
clines. Then a larger share of growth in nominal and real
money accrues to the satellite. The formal analysis here
neglects the role of international balances of payments in
changing allocations of growth in nominal money.
2. A "small" disturbance may be initiated by a satellite.
Its portfolio preference may sbift from reserves to domestic
credit: it prefers to direct more of national savings to
domestic wealth and less to reserve accumulation and so to
finance of the center's fiscal deficit. The effect is to repel
reserves from the satellite to other parts of the monetary
community, to raise the average level of (ro) of domestic
credit ratios, and to increase the world growth rate of
nominal money. Assuming a constant growth rate of re-
serves (t), one can indicate the expansionary impact in
this adaptation of equation (3) :
d(m:)= d(ro)
1+ro
An increase in any (ro) would be damped, one imagines,
by a subsequent increase in imports (vo) that would shift
portfolio preference in the small country back toward re-
serves. In the context of stable monetary policies by the
center country and other satellites, the one small economy
is unlikely to change its desired domestic credit ratio
substantially.
It is imaginable that a "large" disturbance of the world's
money supply could be touched off by simultaneous im-
pulses in a number of small countries. Their monetary
authorities would set targets for (ro) above actual levels,
inducing domestic excess supplies of reserves and excess
demands for goods and securities. Their excess supplies
of reserves would spill into the monetary systems of other
small countries and of the center country. Then actual
levels of (ro) would rise to the target levels. In time, the
disturbance would be absorbed in higher growth rates of
the world's money supply and price level. Of course, the
disturbance might have a deflationary tilt, with desired
domestic-credit ratios falling relative to existing ratios.
Then reserves would be drawn to the economies that ex-
press demand for reserves and, unless other economies
simultaneously increased their desired domestic-credit ra-
tios or unless the center increases the growth rate of re-
serves, growth rates of the world money supply and price
level would decline.
3. A "large" disturbance could also originate on the market
for money rather than on markets for reserves and
domestic credit. For whatever reason, perhaps an increase
in the growth rates of real income, accelerated growth in
real money demanded could impose excess demand for
money. The result would be a decline in the inflation rate,
accompanied by more or less prolonged instability in out-
put and employment, unless monetary authorities responded
to the public's "demand-pull" with faster growth of the
money supply. For stability of the inflation rate, the
appropriate response, of course, is an increase in (t) or
(ro ) that adjusts (m,;) to (ill,;;). If monetary systems
in small countries prefer not to increase domestic-credit
ratios, perhaps because of concurrent growth in interna-
tional trading, the center authority should acknowledge its
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critical role by raising (t) or (TU) or both. Either instru-
ment of world monetary control can clear excess demands
for money and reserves, provided that no special obstacles
are put in the way of adaptative adjustments in interna-
tional balances of payments.
A "large" disturbance can originate in markets for goods
as we know from the petroleum episode of 1973-74. One
effect is to reduce the growth rate of income (y) and of
real money balances demanded (md)in petroleum-import-
ing countries and, as a result, to generate excess supply of
monev with potentialities for accelerated inflation. In prin-
ciple,-growth in real money demanded by petroleum ex-
porters could sustain monetary equilibrium on the initial
price-level path, but that would be an improbable coin-
cidence. OPEC might prefer monetary reserves so that,
given (ro), the world would be threatened with a deflation-
ary episode. One solution would involve an increase in (t)
by the center monetary authority. Since OPEC demand
for reserves could be unstable, the preferred solution may
be to supply OPEC or any comparable oligopolist with a
non-monetary financial asset. Then the outcome would be
some increase in the world's inflation rate and some trans-
fer of the world's non-monetary wealth.
4. The primary debt of the center's fiscal authority (T) is
an obvious source of fiscal revenues. Disposal of (T) into
portfolios of the world's monetary system yields seignorage
to the center's fiscal authority. If the monetary ex-
pansion exceeds growth in real money demanded, there are
revenues from an inflation tax. These revenues are
a temptation to fiscal-monetary indiscretion in the center
country when government expenditures have risen along a
steep incline and when there is resistance to increases of
conventional tax bases and tax rates as well as to increases
in interest rates paid on (T). They flow not from domestic
money-holders alone but also from money-holders in small
countries whose monetary systems accumulate (T) through
international balances of payments with the center.
Collection of seignorage and the inflation tax by the
center need not be deliberately exploitative. Fiscal deficits
may be financed initially on the security markets of the
center. The increments of (T) may flow to the center
monetary authority when interest rates are driven above its
target levels. Then monetary expansion in the center in-
duces the disequilibria in markets for goods and securities
which drive abroad the share of growth in (T) that small
monetary systems desire on the higher expansion path of
the world's money supply. The fiscal authority of the
center issues debt and the center monetary authority, abid-
ing by a policy guideline without exploitative intent, eol-
lects domestically and abroad the revenues of seignorage
and the inflation tax.
5. If growth in (T) is sustained and accelerated, resistances
develop. Monetary authorities in small countries may ex-
press preference for transfers of gold from the center in
substitution for transfers of (T). One expects the center
monetary authority to respond by closing its "gold win-
dow." Small countries may demand higher interest com-
pensation from the center for their portfolios of (T) so that
the center receives smaller flows of seignorage and inflation-
tax revenues. Authorities, both in small countries and the
eenter, may impose micro-interventions that tend to inhibit
growth in real ineomes. These can include specific controls
over trade in goods, securities, and foreign exehange. Their
net monetary effects, through reductions in (m';;) are
inflationary.